#328: The New (In)Security Strategy?

Let’s talk about the reactions to the national security strategy of the United States, especially in Europe. Now that the new national security strategy of the United States has been released, of course there’s heavy criticism of several aspects of it—mainly the kind of pivot away of the United States from Europe and criticism of European democracies for not being democratic enough and for maybe endangering European nations themselves and their identity.

There are a few points in there where I would say, from what I’ve seen, the document is a little bit shortsighted. It is yet another danger to America’s soft power but also to hard power. It has been frightening allies and may encourage enemies. It’s also strangely conciliatory towards Russia.

That all being said, what is new here? There’s nothing new here other than the continuation of positions we’ve seen emerge within the last years, even within the last decades. Even President Obama already talked about a pivot to the Pacific. Previous presidents, not just Trump, have criticized European nations for not committing enough to NATO.

In fact, the European Union has never been able, since the days when it was the Coal and Steel Community, to create a common European defense policy. And it has been Europe that had to be rescued or protected by the United States during World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and even the wars in Yugoslavia, and now the Ukraine war. At the same time, fossil fuels are still imported from Russia by European nations and not just Hungary.

So we are seeing the typical reaction to a denial of reality within European countries. You may ask yourself how I can say this. I am German myself. Well, I’m also American and I live in the US. And some of these points have annoyed me even when I lived in Germany.

You see, there’s this very strange European position—let’s call it a position of somehow expecting the United States to always be there for Europe, to always, if there’s a problem, be the savior because that’s been the established pattern. The United States has benefited from that arrangement too. And the extension of American military might through European allies has not been unsubstantial. Europe has been a supporter of the American project but as an extension of the European project in a way.

I don’t think that is necessarily ending. What we are seeing here is a less than gentle reminder that Europe needs to wake up. Basically, Europe has received warning after warning that the world is changing and so do our security arrangements have to change.

Russia is not just at war with Europe. It’s at war with the entire West. You can see this in all the rhetoric. Specifically, it’s at war over Europe with the United States. The specific Russian project here is the creation of a zone ranging from Lisbon to Vladivostok under Russian influence. That’s what Russia has been talking about for decades now. And it is what underlies some of what Putin is doing.

Would the withdrawal of the United States from Europe make this more likely? Well, only if you see Europe as some sort of child that can’t defend itself. Let’s remind ourselves the European Union is bigger than the United States. It has more people. It has a huge economy. It has lost the United Kingdom but the UK is still somehow within that sphere. And the UK is definitely within NATO. The European Union has also been supporting Ukraine more than the US in the recent years. So there’s that.

But there’s this strange criticism of the United States versus this idea of the world’s policeman. If the US acts forcefully against countries in the name of democracy, rule of law, world order, Europeans will be the first to say, “How dare the US be the world’s policeman? Who do they think they are?” If the US doesn’t do it, their reaction will be, “How dare they not do this? Who do they think they are?” Basically, the US can’t win in that sense.

At the same time, while Europeans criticize the size of the American military, they have been cutting their militaries with few exceptions and have been using the money for welfare state and other also laudable and probably necessary investments, and then asking the United States, “Well, why don’t you do that?” at the same time relying though on American hard power.

Now the United States is in itself in a crisis. The confrontation with China may be coming and the United States has to prepare for it. It has to be a force within the Pacific just as President Obama said before, and the US has to count on Europe to take care of the Atlantic. How is this so difficult to understand? Why should a political and economic bloc of similar, even almost greater power than the United States not be able to take care of their own security?

It is unbelievable from an American perspective and it should be unbelievable from a European perspective. It’s nice and well to have the US as allies. You should have the US as partners and that partnership should not be in danger. But the party that has endangered this partnership is not the United States, is not President Trump. President Trump has called it out and acted on this discrepancy, but President Obama has called it out. President Biden has called it out. President Bush has called it out. This has been a long-standing American complaint. This is nothing new.

So, the European response has always been, “Put their head in the sand. Wait till another president arrives.” There was plenty they could have said about, “I don’t need to listen to Bush. He’s an idiot.” Now, the position has been, “I don’t need to listen to Trump. He’s an idiot. How dare he?” But they didn’t act on Obama. They didn’t really act under Biden either.

So if the Europeans complain about a lack of American support—you saw Pete Hegseth praise Germany for actually stepping up. So the answer to the United States should be we hear you. We are a little bit concerned about tendencies to cozy up too much to Russia because the war isn’t over yet. And Russia still needs to be defeated and Ukraine needs to win. However, we hear you. We are going to invest more money into our military. We are going to strengthen the continent and we will still need your help and assistance. But Europe will be strong enough to in the future also help the United States just as the United States has been able to help Europe.

Just think about that. If the United States were attacked by somebody, would European armies be able to help? Yes, they helped in Iraq, some of them, and in Afghanistan. But what about something that actually would threaten US survival, just like Putin is threatening European survival right now? If you don’t have an answer to that question, then you see the point of this strategy.

As to the criticism of European democracies, well, there simply is a different idea about freedom of speech in the United States than in most of Europe. I must admit the criticism doesn’t sit well with me completely either, but there’s some points to it that I think Europe has to listen to. But that’s maybe the point of another conversation because there are also points within that American position towards, well, we need to listen to opposition parties in Europe too.

From an American perspective, the danger posed by parties like the AfD in Germany or maybe even Le Pen and some other extremist parties—that danger is underestimated. The AfD simply is not just yet another nationalist or patriotic party. There are some tendencies within that party that are politically not acceptable, shouldn’t be. Nevertheless, people vote for them. And so, you need to solve the problems. See, this is the thing. In order to fight against extremism, you need to address the reasons people vote for these parties. You need to be honest about them. You need to act on that. And you need to find a common sensical and functioning approach towards the problem.

Okay, so to recap, this is a predictable document. There’s nothing new here. Trump is just the latest in a line of messengers telling Europe to wake up and to grow up. At the same time, Europeans are also right to say, “Look, you don’t quite understand what Europe is fighting for, why Europe has to be a European Union and can’t be just individual nation states, because that has been the recipe for disaster and world wars.” So the United States needs to understand the European Union a little bit better, but Europeans also need to understand the American side a little bit better. Yeah. So that may be a banal sounding conclusion, but it’s the truth.

The United States also, maybe as a final point—because I’m not necessarily happy with this document either—the United States needs to seriously consider what documents like these do to its soft power. The view of the US around the world is not as positive as it used to be. I’ve worked in cultural affairs. I know something about that.

One of the biggest strengths not just of soft power but also what people call smart power—combination of soft and hard power—one of the biggest strengths of the US is or has been that its presence in the world has always been preferable to the presence of former colonial powers and to the presence of Russia and communist China. I believe that is still the case. But the United States is in severe danger of losing that benefit. And without that benefit, whether you believe that the US should just be like any other European country or whether you believe in America First, MAGA or whatever, it will not make the world a better place if the United States and Europe go their own paths and if neither of them is seen as a reliable partner in the world.